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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper deals with the problem of relationship between the state and companies, which 
activity is subsidized by the government, given the strong influence of the state on the 
companies and a possibility of the state interference in the company activity. In such cases 
there is a conflict of interests between the state and company, i.e. depending on the subsidy 
level and the level of political risk for the company in the relationship due to the possibility of 
expropriation of funds from the cash flow controlled by company. In this case, value (utility) 
for one of the parties may be positive in the relationship, while for another one it may be 
negative. This paper deals with all possible cases of subsidy levels and expropriation 
parameter resulting in positive value for each party. It also deals with the issue: what 
conditions of subsidy level and expropriation parameter, as well as the level of efforts made 
by company result in value (utility) gain for each party 
 
KEYWORDS: companies subsidized by the government, conflict of interests, political risk, 
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A large number of papers (Brealey R.A., Habib M.A. 1996; Esty B.C. 2003; Byoun S. and Xu 
Z. 2014) are devoted to the problem of relationship between the state and companies in 
project financing. In these papers, much attention is given, in particular, to the use of 
concession and offtake agreements grants to involve a private sponsor in project financing. 
Taking into account the interests of both the private sponsor and the state, the optimal level of 
such concessions is studied. The relationship between the state and the state subsidized 
company is less investigated. The state is obliged to subsidize the activity of the company, 
which produces socially important goods, for which it is impossible or difficult to find the 
substitute goods in such circumstances. Sometimes, in principle, it is possible to find a 
substitute, but this requires additional state investments in substitute goods, in infrastructure, 
without which these substitute goods will not appear, investments, financial investments in 
the form of concession and offtake agreements grants, etc. The costs on these additional 
investments may be so significant that they may be unsustainable for the state budget under 
the specific circumstances. The circumstances may be internal and external. The external 
circumstances may occur in the form of external political risks. Different kinds of external 
sanctions at the state and corporate level resulting in limitation of funding opportunities and 
difficulty of the business project implementation that require considerable efforts: financial, 
managerial, innovation, etc., may be the example of such risks. The adverse external 
circumstances may be related to the external market risks associated with the change of the 
market conditions for the main export goods, such as oil, gas, metals, etc. 
Adverse market conditions for these goods, i.e. a sales slowdown, results in decrease in cash 
flow coming into the country, and the amount of tax revenue decreases accordingly. The 
government may then have the limitations associated with implementation of global 
infrastructure projects requiring significant investments. The internal circumstances include 
the possibility that, although this issue is important for the state, there are many other issues 
that may not be deferred. And this problem solution is still deferred, and this situation may 
last long enough. For example, the situation with activity of the energy companies supplying 
the beneficiary regions may serve as an example of such circumstances. These regions are 
often economically underdeveloped, where there is practically no large business. Sometimes 
these regions have a large territory and small population distributed throughout the territory. 
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Due to the economic underdevelopment of the region, the level of population solvency is low. 
At the same time, the share of population in consumption of the energy company’s goods 
(electricity and heat) sometimes can reach up to 80%. Considering this circumstance, the 
government limits the company product tariffs.        
For all the reasons mentioned above, the cash flow of this company is not determined and 
shows significant volatility. And the cash flow level is often insufficient for normal operation 
of the company and manufacture of products in a volume sufficient to meet the consumers’ 
needs. Of course, the government takes into account the social needs of population and shall 
fulfill its social obligations. Having no economic opportunity to radically effect the outdated 
and inefficient energy system structure of the region, the government is obliged to somehow, 
albeit inefficiently subsidize the energy companies providing the region with power. Such 
system of relationship between the government and the subsidized company may exist long 
enough, until the government finds sufficient means to change significantly the way of supply 
of this region with corresponding goods of adequate quality and in the required quantity. The 
described system of relationship between the state and subsidized company creates an 
interesting agent problem between the government and the company (the government is a 
principal, the company is an agent). An emphasis on the agent problem is made in the 
financial literature. The agent problem was globally set and investigated in the papers of 
Jensen M.C., Meckling W.H. 1976, Jensen M.C. 1998, etc. The concrete mathematical 
models specifying the applicable contracts to mitigate this problem in case where a business 
owner acts as a principal and the management acts as an agent, given the risks for both sides, 
were investigated, for example, in the papers of Gibbons R. 2010; Gibbons R. 2005, 
Minasyan V. 2014. But we will be interested in the agency problem that arises between the 
state and the state subsidized company. If a subsidy from the government is significant, it may 
deprive the company of an incentive to make significant efforts to obtain good results (high 
cash flows), for example, by reducing costs or using any innovations. I.e. the company, 
represented by its top managers, will seek to an increase in utility (value) for itself and will 
not care about the state interests (the utility for the state) in this relationship. The government, 
represented by the certain officials delegated to represent the interests of the state in the 
relationship with the company, may temporarily decrease the amount of the subsidy already 
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given by the government to subsidize this company by finding, from their point of view, 
“more important” ways to use these amounts at this stage. Allocating the appropriate amounts 
to subsidize the company, the appropriate officials from the government, who sometimes 
suffer a shortage of funds to finance other projects in this region, may from time to time ask 
the company to participate in financing of other projects, actually depriving the company of a 
part of the cash flow generated by the company. I.e. the subsidized company has a risk of 
expropriation of a part of the entire cash flow, which it could control in this system of 
relationship. 
A natural task of harmonization of this complex relationship arises, taking into account the 
fact that, generally speaking, both members of this relationship have a specific idea of utility 
for themselves. In this paper, we construct a mathematical model of this relationship, taking 
into account the interests and risks of both the company and the state, and examine the 
optimal behavior of the company and the state in terms of utility for them. 
 
Model description 
Let us set the annual cash flow amount generated by the company X, X = qp , whereq is the 
quantity of goods produced by the company per year, and p  is a unit price. In view of the 
above mentioned state of the company, we suppose that the cash flow value is an uncertain 
and random value X uniformly distributed within the interval [a,b]. The company also invests 
its own funds in the amount of B to do its business. We suppose that the company shall have 
an amount not less than c per year to ensure its normal operation enabling to produce the 
required quantity of products (required by the government from the company). It is assumed 
that to increase the chances of reaching the amount of this value, the government subsidizes 
the company in the amount of K. If the company does not make additional efforts, the full 
amount available to the company is usually not enough for the normal operation of the 
company even in view of the subsidy Y = X + K, i.e. in this case Y < c. In such a case, there 
is no expropriation of funds on the part of public authorities, i.e. the company maintains 
control over the amount Y. If the company makes the necessary efforts, which are evaluated 
by value e, it is supposed that it will be able to decrease its costs by v (or increase utility for 
itself by v). Of course, the company will make the necessary effort, only if v > e. In such a 
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case, these is a possibility that the entire amount, which the company has at its disposal Y = X 
+ K, may be enough for the normal operation of the company, i.e. random value Y may also 
take a value of Y   c. However, in case of such increased flows (i.e. if it turns out that Y   
c), the possibility of the state interference in the company management and expropriation of 
funds from the entire amount, which the company has at its disposal Y, increases. It is 
implemented though parameter   in the model, where 10  . It is the parameter 
determining the risk of expropriation. Expropriation is expressed in a way that the amount 
 KXY  )1(  is actually left at the company’s disposal. Thus, the government 
authorities leave the company the share   of the subsidy amount K, and the share 1 -   of the 
company’s cash flow amount X. The closer   is to one, the bigger share of the subsidy 
amount is left with the company. The closer   is to zero, the bigger share of the company’s 
cash flow amount is left. In such a case, the additional amount )1(1   KXY  is 
withdrawn by the government for other needs. 
 
I) Value for the company without efforts 
 
Let us consider the value (utility) for the company, if it does not make additional effort to 
decrease expenses, V(K). It is evident that 
BKcXKXEBcYYEBYEKV  )|()|()()( , 
where an expected value symbol is expressed as E(.), and E(.|.) is a conditional expected value 
symbol. 
I.e. in this case, receiving subsidy K, the company make no efforts, and limitation by с – K 
value takes place for the company’s cash flow value. The more the subsidy value is, the less 
the cash flow generated by the company is. 
The further calculations depend on the fact, whether the value с – K is more than the 
maximum possible value of the company’s cash flow b or not. 
Let us consider the first case: 
1) с – K > b or K < c –b. I.e. this is the case, when the subsidy value will not cover the 
lack of funds for normal operation of the company, even if the company receives the 
maximum possible cash flow b. 
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In this case (see the proof in Appendix) 
.)( BKKV    (1) 
As is known, 
2
)(
ab
XE

  is an expected value of the company’s cash flow X. The 
designation ab  will be further used for the value proportional to the standard 
deviation of the cash flow random value X (its “volatility”), which, as is known, is .
32
ab 
 
However, such relationship with the government is of some interest for the company, only 
if the value takes on the positive, V(K) >0. 
This implies the need to fulfill the following inequality: 
0 BK or  BK . I.e. the subsidy value shall be sufficiently large. And the 
more the subsidy amount K is, the more the value for the company. 
 
Let us consider the second case: 
2) a с – K   b or c – a K   c –b. I.e. this is the case, when the subsidy value will 
cover the lack of funds for normal operation of the company, if the company receives 
the maximum cash flow level b. 
In this case (see the proof in Appendix) 
)(KV ).)(2)(2(
)(2
1 222 BabacKbacK
ab


 (2) 
The subsidy value, with which the minimum value for the company is achieved, is defined 
by the equation: 0)(22  bacK . I.e. the minimum value is achieved, when  
.)(min  cabcKK  
The quantity of the minimum value is  


 Bbacaab
ab
V ))((
)(2
1 22
min  
.
22
)(
)(22
22

 a
BcBabc
ab
aab





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The minimum value takes on the largest quantity depending on “volatility”  , if volatility 
meets the condition: 
0
22
1
2
2


a
, whence it follows that a , or b =2a. 
I.e. the minimum value takes on the largest value, if the maximum possible value of the 
company's cash flow is two times more than its minimum value. 
In this case, the least value is 
.min aBcV   
However, such relationship with the government is of some interest for the company, only 
if  takes on the positive value, V(K) >0. 
This implies the need to fulfill the following inequality: 
0)(2)(2 222  BabacKbacK  
This condition is fulfilled with all values K, if 
0)(2)( 222  Babcabac , 
or 
Babaababc )(2)()(2 22  ,  
whence it follows that 
.
22
2
B
a
c 


 
It means that having such necessary (required) high enough cash flow levels, any 
subsidies meeting the conditions c – a K   c –b result in positive valuableness for the 
company. 
If the necessary (required) cash flow level meets the condition  
,
22
2
B
a
c 


 
to create the positive value for the company, the subsidy level shall meet one of the 
following conditions: 
)( KK or ,0 )( KK  
where 
 International Journal of Advanced Multidisciplinary Research and Review 
Volume 4, No.:6, 2016 Summer 
Pages: 1 - 26 
 
 
 
International Journal of Advanced Multidisciplinary Research and Review (ISSN 2330-1201) 
Volume 4, No.:6, 2016 Summer                                                                             Page: 8 
 
 
),0,max( 1)( KK  2)( KK  , and 
 BabcabacabcK )(2)()( 2222,1  
 )(2)(2)()( 22 abcBabaababc  
.2222 cBac    
 
II) Value for the company with efforts 
 
If the company makes any effort, then according to the described above system of relationship 
between the company and government, value for the company )(KVe is equal to (see 
Appendix) 
 e-vB-c)Y|()|()( YEcYYEKVe  
.}{)1()|()( evBKKcXPKKcXXEXE    (3) 
Further calculations depend on whether the value с - K exceeds the value of maximum 
possible value of company cash flow b or not. 
Let us consider the first case: 
1) с – K > b or K < c –b. I.e. this is the case when the subsidy value will not cover the 
lack of funds for normal company operation, even if the company receives the 
maximum possible cash flow b. 
Then 


 e-vB-K
2
)(
ab
KVe .evBK    
However, such relationship with the government is of some interest for the company, only 
if  takes on the positive value, V(K) >0. 
This implies the need to fulfill the following inequality: 
0 evBK  or . veBK  
Thus, to obtain the positive valuableness for the company the subsidy level shall exceed 
the value in the right part of the last inequality. 
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2) a с – K   b or c – a K   c –b. I.e. this is the case when subsidy value will cover 
the lack of funds for normal company operation, if the company receives the 
maximum cash flow b. 
Then (see Appendix) 
 
)(KVe .
)1)((
)2(
22
222 evBK
KcbK
KcKcb
ab









 (4) 
In this case, the subsidy value, with which the extreme value for the company is achieved, 
is defined by the equation:  
0)(2)1(4))(1(222  abKcbKc   
 
I.e. when 
.
23
)2(




 сabc
KK extr  
Let us define at which parameter values of risk of expropriation   this value becomes 
positive. This is true, if either 
А) 





0)2(
023
сabc

 
or 
В) 





0)2(
023
сabc

 
Equation system A) is satisfied, if )
2
,
3
2
max(1
bc
ac


 , 
and equation system В) is satisfied, if ).
2
,
3
2
min(0
bc
ac


  
When )
2
,
3
2
max(1
bc
ac


 , the valuableness for the company )(KVe  takes on a 
minimum value at a point
23
)2(




 сabc
KK extr . However, when 
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),
2
,
3
2
min(0
bc
ac


  the valuableness )(KVe  takes on a maximum value at a point 
23
)2(




 сabc
KK extr . 
It may also be noted that since 
23
25
3
2




сba
Kextr , 
if 
i) 025  cba , i.e. bac 25  , 
when 0
3
2
 , extrK  that means that at   parameter values reaching to 
3
2
on the 
right, the unrestricted subsidy level is needed to achieve the extreme value for the 
company 
 (see Figure 1a). 
(2а – b)/3
Кextr
l
1
l
2/3 Ɵ
 
Figure 1a. Dependence of the extreme subsidy level on   parameter. Case 
bac 25  . 
 
If 
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ii) 025  cba , i.e. bac 25  , 
when 0
3
2
 , extrK  that means that at   parameter values reaching to 
3
2
on the 
left, the unrestricted subsidy level is needed to achieve the extreme value for the company 
(see Figure 1b). 
(2а – b)/3
Кextr
l
1
l
2/3 Ɵ
 
 
Figure 1b Dependence of the extreme subsidy level on   parameter. Case .25 bac   
 
 
However, such relationship with the government is of some interest for the company, only 
if  takes on a positive value, )(KVe  >0. 
This implies the need to fulfill the following inequality: 
.0)()222)(()]2([2)23( 222  bcveBababKcbacK   (5) 
Let us consider the following cases: 
a) 023  , i.e. 
3
2
 . 
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In this case the inequality (5) is fulfilled at any K values, if either of the following 
inequalities is fulfilled: 
.0)}()222)(){(23()]2([ 222  bcveBababcbac   (6) 
or 
  )})((6523422{)2( 22222 veBabbcaacabсbcb  
0)222)((2)( 2  veBababac  
Which means 
,02  NML    (7) 
where 
,0)2( 2  cbL ))((6523422 222 veBabbcaacabсbM   
and ).222)((2)( 2 veBababacN   
For the existence of  values, at which the inequality (7) is fulfilled, it is necessary that 
.042  LNM  
When fulfilling the last inequality,  values, at which the company valuableness is 
positive at any K values of subsidy, are defined by inequalities 
21   , where 
L
LNMM
2
42
2,1

  
However, remembering that ,10  we obtain the following 
,)()(     
where 
)1,min( 2)(   and ).0,max( 2)(    
The inequality is opposite to (6), i.e. 
0)}()22)(){(23()]2([ 222  bceBababcbac   
it is fulfilled, if either 2   or .1   
Given that ,10   we obtain that the last inequality is fulfilled in the following cases: 
А) if ,12  then ,12   
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B) if ,01   then ,0 1   
and in these cases the subsidy levels, at which the company valuableness is positive, are 
defined by either of the inequalities: 
2KK   or 1KK   where 
.
23
)]2([ 2
2,1




 NMLcbac
K  
Though, given the need to meet the natural requirement, K > 0, 
it is necessary to meet the following conditions in order to fulfill 01 K  inequality: 
 





023
0)2(

 cbaс
 
These conditions are met with   parameter values satisfying the inequalities  
,1)
2
,
3
2
max( 



bc
ac
 
Otherwise, the subsidy levels, at which the valuableness for the company is positive, are 
defined by one inequality: 
2KK   
If 
b) 023  , i.e. 
3
2
 , 
To fulfill the inequality (5) it is necessary to fulfill the following: 
0)}()22)(){(23()]2([ 222  bceBababcbac   or 
02  NML  . 
Solutions of the last inequality are defined by  values satisfying either 1  or 2   
inequalities, 
where 
L
LNMM
2
42
2,1

  
However, remembering that 10   we obtain the following 
)(0   or )(1   , 
 International Journal of Advanced Multidisciplinary Research and Review 
Volume 4, No.:6, 2016 Summer 
Pages: 1 - 26 
 
 
 
International Journal of Advanced Multidisciplinary Research and Review (ISSN 2330-1201) 
Volume 4, No.:6, 2016 Summer                                                                             Page: 14 
 
 
where 
)1,min( 2)(   and ).0,max( 2)(    
In these cases, the subsidy levels, at which the valuableness for the company is positive, 
are defined by inequalities: 
21 KKK  , where 
.
23
)]2([ 2
2,1




 NMLcbac
K  
Though, given the need to meet the natural requirement, K > 0, 
it is necessary to fulfill the following conditions in order to fulfill 01 K  inequality: 





023
0)2(

 cbaс
 
 
These conditions are fulfilled with   parameter values satisfying the inequalities  
).
2
,
3
2
min(0
bc
ac


  
 
However, in order for the company to make some efforts, the government shall offer it 
such subsidy level that the following inequality to be fulfilled 
0)()(  KVKVe . 
Let us consider the first case: 
1) с – K > b or K < c –b. I.e. this is the case when the subsidy value will not cover the 
lack of funds for normal company operation, even if company receives the largest cash 
flow b. 
Then 
0e-)()(  vKVKVe . 
It means that the company is interested in making additional efforts at such subsidy levels. 
2) a с – K   b or c – a K   c –b. I.e. this is the case when subsidy value will not 
cover the lack of funds for normal company operation, even if company receives 
maximum possible cash flow b. Then 
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0)])((2)2(
)1)((2)2([
2
1
)()(
222
22222


abevaKcKc
KcbKKcKcbabKVKVe 
  
Or 
0))((2)1)(()]1(2[2)1(3 222  abevbcKbcK   
The subsidy levels satisfying the last condition exist, only if 
0))()(1(6)()1(3)]1(2[ 2222  abevbcbc   
Let us define   parameter values at which the last inequality is fulfilled. 
Having designated  1 , this inequality will take the following form: 
0))((6)(344 222222  abevbcbcbc   
04)])((32[2]34[ 2222  cabevcbcb   (8) 
Let us consider the following cases: 
X) 034
22  cb , i.e. bc
3
32
 . If the inequality is fulfilled: 
0)34(4)])((32[ 2222  cbcabevcb ,  
the inequality (8) will be fulfilled when 2   or 1  , where 
,
2
2,1
D
DFEE 
  
where ,34 22 cbD  ),)((32 abevcbE  а .4 2cF   
Given that ,10   inequality (8) is fulfilled when 
1min   and max0   , 
where 
)1,min( 2min    and )0,max( 1max   . I.e. when 
min10   and .11 max    
In case of these   parameter values, the subsidy levels, which lead to additional value for 
the company from the effort made, are defined by inequalities: 
21 KKK  , where 
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.
)1(3
))()(1(6)()1(3))1(2()1(2 2222
2,1





abevbcbcbc
K  
If 
0)34(4)])((32[ 2222  cbcabevcb , 
the inequality (8) will be fulfilled at any  . 
In case 
Y) 034
22  cb , i.e. bc
3
32
 . It is obvious that the inequality (8) may be fulfilled only 
after the following inequality is fulfilled 
0)34(4)])((32[ 2222  cbcabevcb . 
At that, the inequality solutions (8) are given as interval 21   . 
Given that ,10   the inequality (8) is fulfilled when 
minmax   . I.e. when .11 1min    
In case of these   parameter values, the subsidy levels, which lead to additional value for 
the company from the effort made, are also defined by inequalities: 
21 KKK  , where 
.
)1(3
))()(1(6)()1(3))1(2()1(2 2222
2,1





abevbcbcbc
K  
 
 
III) Value for the state without company efforts 
 
The state is interested in sufficient company production output q that will be presented 
with utility function U(q) in the model. In this case, if the company does not make efforts 
e, the state counts on the low quality product output Lq . Value for the state from such 
system of relationship with the company is presented with value G(K), where 
.)]([)( KqUEKG L   
However, the government wants the valuableness to take on a positive value, G(K) >0. 
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This implies the need to fulfill the following inequality: 
K)]([ LqUE . I.e. the expected production utility for the state shall exceed the level of 
the company subsidization. 
 
 
IV) Value for the state with company efforts 
 
The state is interested in sufficient company production output q that will be presented 
with utility function U(q) in the model. In this case, if the company makes additional 
efforts e, the state counts on high quality product output Hq . Given that there is 
expropriation of the company funds in the large cash flow, value for the state is presented 
with Ge(K), where 
  KcYYEqUEKG He ]|[)]([)( 1   
.]|)1([)]([ KKcXKXEqUE H    
Further calculations depend on whether the value с - K exceeds the value of the maximum 
possible value of the company cash flow b or not. 
Let us consider the first case: 
1) с – K > b or K < c –b. I.e. this is the case when the subsidy value does not cover the 
lack of funds for normal company operation, even if the company receives the 
maximum possible cash flow b. 
Then 
K)]([)(  He qUEKG . 
However, the government wants to take on a positive value, Ge(K) >0. 
This implies the need to fulfill the following inequality: 
K)]([ HqUE . I.e. the expected production utility for the state shall exceed the level of 
the company subsidization. 
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2) a с – K   b or c – a K   c –b. I.e. this is the case when the subsidy value covers 
the lack of funds for normal company operation, if the company receives the 
maximum cash flow b. 
Then (see proof in Appendix) 
)(KGe .))()(3(
2
))(()]([ KKcbKcbKcb
K
qUE H 



 (9) 
In this case, the subsidy value, with which the extreme value for the state is achieved, is 
defined by equation: 0)]2([2)23(2  bccaK   
 
I.e. when 
.
23
)2(




 сabc
KK extr  
When 
3
2
 , this subsidy level results in the maximum value for the state, and when 
3
2
 , this subsidy level results in the minimum value for the state. I.e. the company and 
state interests are contending in this case. 
 
However, the government wants to take on a positive value, Ge(K) >0. 
This implies the need to fulfill the following inequality: 
 KabKcbKcbKcbKK )(2)(3)()(232 22 
0)]([)(2))((  HqUEabcbcb  
or 
KbccaK )]2([2)23( 2   0)]([)(2)( 22  HqUEabbc . 
Let us consider the first case: 
1) 023   or .
3
2
  
Then the subsidy levels that satisfy the last condition exist, only if 
0)]}([)(2)(){23()]2([ 222  HqUEabbcbcca   
Let us define   parameter values, with which the last inequality is fulfilled. 
This inequality is equivalent to the following inequality: 
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0)]([)(4)(
)]([)(6)(2)2)((2)(3)2(
2
2222222


H
H
qUEabca
qUEabbcbccabcbc 
 
or 
0)]}([)(4)(
)]}([)(32{2)2(
2
2222


H
H
qUEabca
qUEabbcbcabacbc 
 
It means 
022  TSR  ,                                                                                             (10) 
where 
2)2( bcR  , 
)]([)(32 22 HqUEabbcbcabacS  , 
)]([)(4)( 2 HqUEabcaT 
 
I.e. 0)2( 2  bcR , if in this case inequality 02  RTS  is fulfilled, inequality (9) is 
fulfilled at any   parameter values. 
If opposite inequality 0
2  RTS  is fulfilled, inequality (10) is fulfilled, when 2  or 
1  , 
where 
R
RTSS 

2
2,1  
However, remembering that ,10   inequality (9) is fulfilled, when 1)(   or 
)(0    
where 
)1,min( 2)(    and ).0,max( 2)(    
In this case, the subsidy levels necessary for positive valuableness for the state are defined 
by inequalities: 
21 KKK  , where 
23
)]]([)(2)()[23()]2([)2( 222
2,1




 HqUEabbcbccabcca
K  
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Given that subsidy levels K are positive, such subsidy levels exist only when 02 K and 
are defined by inequalities 
  21 KKK , where 
)0,max( 11 KK 
  and ).0,max( 22 KK 
  
In this case, if ,02 
K  there are no subsidy levels resulting in positive value for the state. 
Let us consider the second case, when 
2) 023   or .
3
2
  
Then, if 
0)]}([)(2)(){23()]2([ 222  HqUEabbcbcca  , 
i.e. if 
1)(   or when )(0    
where 
)1,min( 2)(    and ),0,max( 2)(    
the subsidy levels necessary for positive value for the state are defined by inequalities: 
2KK   or 1KK  , where 
23
)]]([)(2)()[23()]2([)2( 222
2,1




 HqUEabbcbccabcca
K  
 
Given that subsidy levels K are positive, such subsidy levels exist only when 02 K and 
are defined by inequalities 
 2KK  or 
 1KK where 
)0,max( 11 KK 
  and ).0,max( 22 KK 
  
In this case, if ,02 
K  there are no subsidy levels resulting in positive value for the state. 
 
However, if the company made an effort e, the state is interested to get the valuableness 
gain for itself. I.e. it is desirable to fulfill the inequality: 
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0)()(  KGKGe . 
Let us consider the first case: 
1) с – K > b or K < c –b. I.e. this is the case when the subsidy value does not cover the 
lack of funds for normal company operation, even if company receives the maximum 
possible cash flow b. 
Then 
 )()( KGKGe )]([ HqUE 0)]([ LqUE  
It means that the state is interested in the company efforts, if the expected high quality 
product output utility is larger than that of the low quality products, i.e. 
)]([ HqUE )].([ LqUE  
2) a с – K   b or c – a K   c –b. I.e. this is the case when the subsidy value covers 
the lack of funds for normal company operation, if the company receives the 
maximum cash flow b. Then 
 )()( KGKGe  
.0))()(3(
2
))(()])([)]([(  bcKKcbbcK
K
qUEqUE LH



 (11) 
I.e. in this case 0)((  bcK , if natural condition )]([ HqUE )]([ LqUE  is fulfilled, 
fulfillment of inequality (11) requires the inequality: 03  Kcb , which is equivalent to 
.
3
cb
K

  I.e. when these conditions are fulfilled, the state gets the valuableness gain 
from the effort made by the company. 
It is also known from (10) that when conditions )]([ HqUE )]([ LqUE  and 
3
cb
K

  are 
fulfilled, increase in   political risk parameter results in increase in valuableness gain for 
the state, while growth of   company cash flow volatility reduces the valuableness gain 
from the effort made by the company for the state. 
Let us denote )]([)]([)( LH qUEqUEUE   
Let us find all K values, with wich inequality (11) is fulfilled, i.e. 
0)(
2
))(3(
22
3
)()( 222
2
 bcKcbbcKbc
KK
UE







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or 
0)(2)())2((2)32( 222  UEbcKbcbcK   (12) 
The following cases are possible: 
1) 032    or 
3
2
 . 
If, in this case, the following inequality is fulfilled 
0)](2)()[32())2(( 222  UEbcbcbc  , 
inequality (12) is fulfilled at any K subsidy level values. 
The last inequality is equivalent to the following one: 
0)(4)(
))(332(2)247(
2
22222


UEbc
UEbcbcbcbc


 
Or 
022  CBA   (13) 
where 
22 247 bcbcA  , 
)(332 22 UEbcbcB   , 
)(4)( 2 UEcbC   . 
Let us suggest that 
A) 0247
22  bcbcA . It is easy to check that this condition is fulfilled, when 
.
7
232
bc

  
If, in this case, inequality 0
2  ACB  is fulfilled, inequality (13) is fulfilled, when 
21    
where 
A
ACBB 

2
2,1  
However, remembering that ,10   inequality (13) is fulfilled, when )()(    , 
where 
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)1,min( 2)(    and ).0,max( 2)(    
If the opposite inequality is fulfilled: 
B) 0247 22  bcbcA , i.e. if bc
7
232
 , 
inequality (13) is fulfilled, when 
)(0    or when 1)(    
In all these cases, the subsidy levels necessary for valuableness gain from additional 
efforts made by the company for the state are defined by inequalities: 
2KK   or 1KK  , 
where 


32
)](2)()[32()]2([)2( 222
2,1



UEbcbcbcbcbc
K  
 
Given that K subsidy levels are positive, the subsidy levels necessary for valuableness 
gain for the state are defined by inequalities 
 10 KK , where )0,max( 11 KK 
  or 2KK  . 
If 
2) 032    or 
3
2
 . 
If, in this case, inequality 
0)](2)()[32())2(( 222  UEbcbcbc   (14) is fulfilled, 
inequality (12) is fulfilled, when K subsidy level values satisfy the conditions: 
21 KKK  . 
Given that K subsidy levels are positive, the subsidy levels necessary for valuableness 
gain for the state are defined by inequalities 
21 KKK 
  where )0,max( 11 KK 
 . 
Let us find   parameter values, when inequality (14) is fulfilled. 
It is obvious that, when 
C) 0247
22  bcbcA . I.e. when bc
7
232
  
inequality (13) will be fulfilled when )(0    or when 1)(   . 
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If 
D) 0247 22  bcbcA  or when bc
7
232
  
inequality (13) is fulfilled, when 
)()(    . 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper deals with the relationship between the state and the state subsidized company. 
In such cases there is a conflict of interests between the state and company, i.e. depending 
on the subsidy level and the level of political risk for the company in the relationship due 
to the possibility of expropriation of funds from the cash flow controlled by company. In 
this case, value (utility) for one of the parties may be positive in the relationship, while for 
another one it may be negative. 
The company can make additional efforts to increase the valuableness. But, in this case, 
valuableness (utility) gain from the efforts made by the company does not always result in 
value (utility) gain for the state. This paper deals with all possible cases of subsidy levels 
and expropriation parameter resulting in positive valuableness for each party. It also deals 
with the issue: what conditions of subsidy level and expropriation parameter, as well as 
the level of efforts made by company result in value (utility) gain for each party. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Proof of formula (1) 
Let us consider the first case: 
If с – K > b or K < c – b, 
.
2
))(
22
(
1
)(
1
)(
22
BKBK
ab
BabK
ab
BdxKxKV
b
a


  
 (1) 
Proof of formula (2). 
If a с – K   b or c – a K   c –b, 
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

 

BK
aKc
BКxdxKV
Kc
a
)
22
)(
(
11
)(
22

 
).)(2)(2(
)(2
1 222 BabacKbacK
ab


  (2) 
 
 
Proof of formula (3). 
If the company makes effort e, according to the described system of relationship between the 
company and the government, value for the company ),(KVe  is equal to 
 e-vB-c)Y|()|()( YEcYYEKVe  
 evBKcXPKKcXXEKcXKPKcXXE }{)|()1(}{)|(   
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Proof of formula (4). 
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Proof of formula (9). 
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